



ERSiSi
Servicios para la Inclusión
Inklusiorako zerbitzuak

INTEGRATED DELIVERY OF 
SERVICES FOR MINIMUM
INCOME RECIPIENTS:
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF 
 THE IMPACT EVALUATION OF
THE ERSISI PROJECT IN NAVARRA

Grupo ALTER. Universidad Pública de Navarra
Spanish and English version



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
Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the preliminary results of the project *Enhancing the Right to Social Inclusion through Service Integration* (ERSISI), oriented towards the integrated delivery of social and employment services in Navarra (Spain), with the aim of providing high quality tailor-made support to people at risk of social exclusion. Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-Differences have been used to estimate the impact of the programme. The results show a positive impact on the permanence in activation services for six months after the end of people's participation in the project. No significant effects are observed in the results variables linked to contracts, months in unemployment and permanence in the minimum income system. However, it will be necessary to wait until June 2020, twelve months after the end of the project, to estimate the impact of these last variables in a more robust manner.

Keywords: integration of services, impact assessment, active employment policies.



INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT



INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

The recent worldwide financial crisis and its effects on the fields of production and employment has laid out a new set of challenges for welfare states. One of the problems that many countries and regions of the EU face in the sphere of social policies consists of finding suitable institutional mechanisms to address the situation of vulnerable groups of society, normally those with higher levels of difficulty in accessing the job market. In the majority of EU member states, the financial crisis has intensified the instability of the job market, and at the same time, political and fiscal pressure to improve the efficiency of public services, especially those directed towards helping the unemployed return to the job market.

The new challenges in this situation require an adjustment in the design of social protection systems that arose from a context of stable employment and were to provide a safe setting for temporarily supporting unemployed households, and social assistance for those that couldn't work. The need for such reforms has been emphasized for more than a decade by the European Commission in the framework of the "Active Inclusion Strategy" (European Commission, 2008), which indicates that all inclusion programs require effective combinations that guarantee: (i) adequate income support together with help to get a job; (ii) inclusive labour markets and (iii) access to quality services helping people participate actively in society. In said intervention, the participation of the people in inclusion programs and activities is fundamental (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011). These same criteria are currently expressed in the European Pillar of Social Rights (European Commission, 2017).



From an institutional point of view, the biggest challenge when it comes to lending services to vulnerable groups is the coordination and balance between services and agencies in charge of managing public benefits and those responsible for finding employment and other areas of activation. The integration of public services is a question of regulations that is increasingly relevant in the models of European welfare, based on the assumption that those fragmented services do not offer efficient and effective responses to citizens' needs. Several studies carried out in the last few years coincide in the need to reform the work methods and administrative organization of these services in order to achieve a greater balance between the protection, activation, quality of service, and consequently the results of social inclusion policies (Heidenrich & Rice, 2016; Minas, 2016; Scharle, 2018). It has been indicated that those adjustments pass through the partial or total integration of unemployment insurance benefits, the systems of minimum income, and social services for the working-age recipients of public benefits (Askim et al.,

2011; Heidenrich & Rice, 2016; Scharle, 2018). Although an important number of Member States have responded to these challenges, significant variations in the depth and sophistication of the reform initiatives in all of Europe still exist. In the majority of countries, this means institutional reforms of a certain complexity since social and employment policies are coordinated by different governmental levels and implemented by a variety of institutions both public and private and by the third sector.

It is within this framework that the ERSISI project is developed. Its main goal has been to produce evidence about a new services delivery model that articulates economic protection with integrated attention between social and employment services that would make the pathways of inclusion in the job market more effective. In the presence of the stances that uphold the idea that the mechanisms that guarantee an income demotivate the access to employment by beneficiaries, the hypothesis of the project is that **a wider system of guaranteed income, accompanied by improved support and conditions, can encourage and not discourage the reintegration into the job market.** This hypothesis centers on the responsibility of the inclusion of people in the job market in the institutional sphere, given that employment activation has as a condition not only a minimum threshold of economic protection that allows for the satisfaction of basic necessities, but also access to quality services in the fields of counseling, training, and intermediation for employment. On this matter, ERSISI has piloted an institutional response that means to fulfill European recommendations on the subject of social inclusion, expressed in the Ley Foral 15/2016, on 11th November, in which the rights of social inclusion and a guaranteed income are regulated, and in the Strategic Inclusion Plan of Navarra (2018-2021).



THE LOGIC OF INTERVENTION



The Logic of Intervention

The needs that the project gives answers to and the logic of intervention can be summarized in the following way: as a consequence of the social and economic crisis that started in 2007, a tendency of a rise in unemployment and particularly, long-term unemployment, was established. From the point of view of the system of guaranteed income, this produced a fall in the coverage rate of unemployment benefits, and an increase in non-contributory benefits, particularly in the Minimum Income scheme (in Navarre called the Social Inclusion Income and later called the Guaranteed Income). This was combined with the accumulation of problems for the most vulnerable sectors, such as housing and health problems (FOESSA, 2019). The extent in time of these phenomena led to an accumulation of difficulties in individuals and in families, giving rise to “profiles of multiple needs”. The institutional responses to these needs were shown to be insufficient, particularly those focused on the reinsertion of people to employment. The social complexity that the services dedicated to guaranteeing the processes of inclusion face requires an institutional organization that does not correspond to the levels of segmentation that these services currently demonstrate. In the specific case of social and employment services in Navarre, this lack of coordination was made evident in the diagnostic study of ERSISI in the following ways:

- A scarcity of single access points (one-stop-shop) for the supplementary services offered by social and employment services.
- Unsuitable continuity between the activation measures offered by employment agencies on one hand, and social services on the other. In addition, the supplementary programs that are managed by other agencies are underused.
- The need to share information and management tools between social services and employment agencies.
- Different organizational cultures among employment and social services.
- Slowness in the enrollment process for obtaining benefits.
- Insufficient strength in activation measures (training, guidance), especially for the most vulnerable groups, and an insufficient offer of training that is not adapted to the true needs of these groups
- A lack of defined responses in accordance with the profiles of these groups, and an insufficient supervision of individual cases.
- An insufficient cooperation effort with employers.

In order to confront these critical points, the ERSISI project will test an intervention model that has an improvement in the economic protection of its Minimum Income system as its central concept. This core idea corresponds to the recommendations made by the European institutions that place the guarantee of income as a condition of the implementation of social inclusion initiatives (European Commission, 2008). In this respect, the project is closely linked to the development and application of the *Ley Foral 15/2016, of 11th November, in which the rights of social inclusion and guaranteed income are regulated*. This reform has reached all of Navarre, which from the point of view of the experimentation carried out by the project, implies a contextual factor. In particular, the reforms that the Guaranteed Income has entailed, have allowed for the testing of an employment activation model in a more economically protective framework for people and an improvement in bureaucratic procedures.

The second point of the project addresses the problem of the adaption of the resources and employment activation measures to the needs and characteristics of people and the territory. The attention models directed toward the person, in the presence of other models that are traditionally service-oriented designed, require an adaptation of the intervention resources to the needs and interests of the people (tailor-made responses). This entails resources that are flexible and adaptable to diverse situations (Borja, 2013; Rodríguez Rodríguez, 2013). At the same time, the processes of reinsertion to the job market require a combination of interventions geared toward bringing job seekers and job offers closer together, and qualifying or requalifying the unemployed. Evidence exists about the importance of the local scope in the designing of measures of employment activation (Finn, 2000; Kunzel, 2012). Along those lines, ERSISI has put a new procedure to the test for the planning of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) through Local Employment Groups in Tudela and Sakana, comprised of actors from the public and private sectors, and civil society. The goal of these groups has been to produce reform proposals in activation measures- particularly in employment training- adapted to the needs of the population and the possibility of acting on existing barriers and local factors that allow for social and labor inclusion. This concept bases itself on the principle that the participation of local agents is crucial in order to achieve a more suitable definition of the goals of intervention and that it is more efficient to act on existing barriers and local factors that allow for social and labor inclusion. Starting with actions such as identifying the demand for labour in the area, the needs of the employers sectors, and the training needs of beneficiaries, the goal of these groups has been to design a more suitable combination of measures, especially those related to vocational training, adapting them to the needs of the economic environment and the profiles of the beneficiaries. These actions

become more effective if they are designed and executed while taking into account both the needs and characteristics of those seeking employment and the economic and production characteristics of the area. This would mean a “bottom-up” approach in the design of activation policies, with the aim being to guarantee measures and resources adapted to the realities of each region (Künzel, 2012).

Figure 1. Local partnership for ALMPs

PARTENARIADO LOCAL: creación de alianzas y comités de participación entre los agentes y asociaciones, públicas, privadas y tercer sector, que intervienen en los procesos de activación sociolaboral.



- Recoger, analizar y actualizar **información sobre la situación y perspectivas del empleo** en las zonas y sobre la población desempleada.
- **Alinear oferta formativa** y necesidades del tejido local y las personas.
- **Perfilar las necesidades** en relación con instrumentos de las Políticas Activas de Empleo (PAE).
- **Dar a conocer el proyecto ERSISI** a los empleadores, involucrarles en sus objetivos, y explorar posibilidades de realizar acciones formativas conjuntas.



Representantes de Servicios Sociales y de Empleo; Agencias de Desarrollo Local; Asociación de Empresas; Consorcios de Entidades Locales; tercer sector; Equipo Gestor de Casos.

Source: Prepared by the authors

Finally, in the framework of stronger guarantee of income and an improvement in the measures and design of employment activation, the project has designed and tested a model of integrated delivery of social and employment services based on case management methodology with a tailored and personalized approach that puts emphasis on their strengths and personal self-determination. This intervention has been tested on 502 people. It consisted of the work of four pairs of case managers, three of them located in the Employment Agency of Tudela, and one of them in the Employment Agency of Alsasua. These pairs of case managers were made up of one professional with a profile focused on employment, and another with a profile focused on social intervention. The goal of these case handlers teams has been to design and put to the test an individualized model of attention/activation of high intensity for people in a situation of vulnerability or at risk of social exclusion. The model has also indicated to carry out an optimal use of the network of resources for employment activation and socio-labor integration.


Figure 2. Services integration. Case-handlers teams



Source: Prepared by the authors

In this way, ERSISI entails a logic of intervention that can be summarized in the following diagram:

Figure 3. Intervention logic



Source: Prepared by the authors

To sum up, ERSISI has tested a “social policy experiment” that has allowed for the gathering of evidence about the relationship between an improvement in the system of minimum income (the right to social protection) and a program of social inclusion that is understood as a right and is based on contractual agreement between the beneficiary and the public services. This agreement, explained as the offer of a quality service focused on the social/ labor inclusion of the beneficiary, fulfills the obligation of public services in offering means of inclusion, as indicated in the Decreto Foral 26/2018, of 25th April, of the development of social inclusion rights and a guaranteed in-

come, in whose wording were included contributions made by experts in the framework of the project. In this sense, the project has allowed for offering a model that brings about normative development y provides assessment of its operation, such as improvement aspects of it.

Assigning the participants

The target population the pilot is aimed at is comprised of those from both areas that are found to be in a situation of employment availability and receiving one of the following public benefits: Guaranteed Income (GI); Active Incorporation Income (All) or Unemployment Benefits.

For the total number of these people (which we called the “potential ERSISI” population), the selection process of those that were proposed to incorporate into the project was done by lot and take into account a combination of stratification variables: GENDER, AGE, and COUNTRY OF BIRTH.

As will be indicated below, it should be pointed out that this random selection process was done separately between the control group and the intervention group. The randomization of the process in this case isn’t used to make up two equal groups from a probabilistic point of view, but rather it is done in order to avoid “cherry picking”, also known as the fallacy of incomplete evidence, in which individuals that can perform better in the project are selected in order to obtain desired, predictable results.

Regarding the assignment of participation in the project, it is important to point out that in the case of those people receiving GI, so as not to intercede in the reasons that justify it, participation has been subjected to the regulations of the *Ley Foral 15/2016, of 11 November, in which the right to social inclusion and guaranteed income are regulated*. In Article 18 of said law establishes that member of family units receiving Guaranteed Income must fulfill the following obligations: “to participate in socio-labor integration activities that the Base Social Services (specialized social services or employment services) propose to them.” In this sense, participation in the project has been limited to the rights and obligations established by the current legislation of The Right to Social Integration and Guaranteed Income.

As an administrative decision, the composition of the groups was established in the following way: beneficiaries of GI about 86% of the total number (430 people) and people receiving other benefits (subsidies, excluding >65 years old; All) 14% of the total number (72 people).

In addition, by the priorities determined in the project, it was decided that the following profiles (vulnerable groups) would be represented sufficiently. The quotas were determined at the beginning of the project. In parenthesis “()”, the number of effective participants is indicated, corresponding to the established quota.

Women: using data from the GI as a reference, women are slightly in the majority. Therefore, a criteria of approximately 60% was determined (309 women have participated)

The Youth: (18-30 years old) at least around 20% (99 young people participated)

Adults: (31-49 years old) are the majority collective among working-age beneficiaries of Guaranteed Income, and therefore have been assigned a quota of around 70% (356 adults participated)

People over 50 years old: keeping in mind the characteristics of this group, it is important that there is at least 10% participation (48 people over 50 years old participated).

Foreign people: the percentages of GI differ between Tudela and Western Sakana. A reference of 30% was proposed (77 people in Tudela) and 20% (22 people in Western Sakana) respectively.

This has meant that a total of 12 sub-groups have been formed.

GRAPH

From these sub-groups, quotas were established for doing drawing the candidates' profiles according to the percentages previously mentioned.


Waves of interventions

From September of 2017 on, with a three week regularity, the candidates who were invited to participate in the project were selected by drawings. As detailed in the NN Appendix, this selection was done by using a database from the Department of Social Rights with information about potential beneficiaries of the project in each of those areas, that is, those potential candidates that matched the characteristics in the previous section. From that database a random selection was done using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel®.

These people were summoned to an informative meeting via certified letter in where they were informed about the project and, excluding those properly justifiable reasons, began their participation in the project.

The intervention was done by incorporating groups in “waves” that were joined in every 2-3 weeks, as shown in Graph N.

Figure 4. Waves of intervention and measurement of base lines and impact (6 and 12 months)



Source: our development based on administrative records.

The number of people that participated in each wave changed in an increasing manner, according to the case management teams and the project itself.

Selection of sources of data and measurement

For the impact assessment, a series of data originating from administrative records were used.

- Period considered: form January 2016 to May 2019.
- Sources of origins of records:
 - Database of jobseekers de SNE-NL (SISPE) (ORS).
 - Databases of contract records de SNE-NL (SISPE) (ORS).
 - Databases of Guaranteed Income Stock (Derechos Sociales) (ORS).
 - Databases of Guaranteed Income Flow. (Derechos Sociales) (ORS).

- ORIENTASARE. Orientation, Training and Job Offers Services From the Navarra Employment Service-Nafar Lansare.
- Training. Training and Job Offers Services From the Navarra Employment Service -Nafar Lansare.

From the point of view of the impact of the project, the outcome variables are the following: employment activation (continuance in the system), employment (contract and numbers of months unemployed), and continuance in the Guaranteed Income System. It is important to point out that these results are linked logically and temporarily. In other words, if the previously stated starting point is kept in mind, which is a lack of participation in actions of employment activation, the first expected result is the activation of employment. Activation of employment is understood as the participation in actions of orientation and employment training once their participation period in the pilot program is complete. This activation is expected to later lead to (at least 12 months after the intervention, as pointed out in specialized literature) an improvement in employment, operationalized from indicators of contracts and months in unemployment. Eventually, around the 18th month after the end of the intervention, it is hoped that the improvement in unemployment will mean less of a need to resort to the aid of monetary benefits such as Guaranteed Income, unemployment benefits, and Active Insertion Income.

Taking into account that the pilot program ended in June 2019, it is only currently possible to obtain a precise evaluation of the activation outcome. For the remaining indicators a counterfactual model of assessment has been implemented. The ideal time to obtain a precise measurement will be in June 2020.

Evaluation Techniques

As it has been stated, the impact assessment measures the results of the program in comparison with an estimate of what would have happened in its absence. This estimate can be obtained through counterfactual techniques. To select the method, initially the possibility of applying an experimental design was considered. This design would randomly divide the two groups of people that fulfilled the participation requirements from the same village. However, even though this system was considered better to assess the impact, because of the reasons that were previously stated regarding the configuration of the control group, we have discarded this option upon concluding that this method isn't viable in the ERSISI program.

Therefore, after considering the different options of non-experimental and observational methods, we chose the so-called *Difference-in-differences* (DiD), combined with the *Propensity Score Matching* (PSM). The combined use of both techniques is common in the impact assessment of employment activation programs.

Propensity Score Matching (PSM) consists of calculating the probability of an individual being treated with each combination values of the pairing variables. These probabilities are calculated with a **logistic model**. If two individuals have the same propensity score, then they have the same value in the pairing variables, regardless of having been treated or not. R software was used for estimating the **logistic**, and the **R Matching** packet for pairing the individuals. As opposed randomly assigning them, in which chance would balance observable and non-observable characteristics, in the pairing in an observational study we can only balance in agreement with the variables that we have observed. In our study we chose the following variables:



- **Sex**
- **Fnccto**: ESPAÑA; “MARRUECOS”=“ARGELIA”=LIBIA”=“TUNEZ”=“MAGREB”; “OTROS”
- **Age**
- **PrimeroDeZDENO**: SSB (base services) of the request.
- **Largaduracion** (== 1 if in the twelve months prior to the intervention it appears as long-term unemployed)
- **Mediapar**(= proportion of months that have been unemployed in the pre-intervention period)
- **Nivelform** (= maximum training level reached in the pre-intervention period): 8 levels are considered (1 = illiterate and without studies, 2 = primary, 3 = medium level, 4 = FP, 5 = presuperior, 6 = superior, 7 = rest, 0 = nk/na)
- **tiempoRGP**PRE: proportion of time that the GR has received in the pre-intervention period.
- **Hijos**: we consider that there are minors if the recipient is in one of the categories 10, 11, 12, 13,18,23, 24, 25, 26 of the list of values that the variable provided in RG can take PrimeroDeDESCHOGAR.

The DiD technique consists of having information about the control group and treatment in two periods, before and after the public intervention took place. The method consists of calculating the differences in the temporary evolution of each group (first difference) so that later we could observe the

difference in growth that was produced between the control group and the treatment group (second difference). The combination of DiD with the *Propensity Score Matching* results in being useful in avoiding a biased selection and assures that the characteristics of the control group matches those of the participation group.



RESULTS



RESULTS

Impact Estimation

If we consider the project hypothesis, one of the ways to operationalize the incentive (encourage) to the employment of people is expressed in the participation in the main actions of the activation measures: counseling and training. In that sense, the records of these actions from the Navarro Employment Service allow us to quantify the actions that a person has performed. As noted, for the ERSISI project we have these data longitudinally, between January 2016 and May 2019.

The services in question can be grouped into eight:

1	Self-employment
2	Employability diagnosis
3	Group Workshop on Active Job Search
4	Work on individual aspects for the BAE
5	Informative actions
6	Active job search techniques
7	Actions without specific or specific content
8	Training / Return to the education system

As a first point in the presentation of these results, it should be noted that several investigations have shown that people with low educational level participate less in non-regulated training activities in general and training for employment in particular (Cueto Iglesias & Suárez Cano, 2011). When analyzing the participation in counseling and training actions for the employment of the beneficiaries of the ERSISI project - mostly with a low level of education - we effectively find that in the twelve months prior to the intervention around 36% of the people had not carried out training or employment guidance.


Table 1. People who in the twelve months prior to the intervention had not received activation actions for employment.

WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3	WAVE 4	WAVE 5	WAVE 6	WAVE 7	WAVE 8
46,67	45,10	56,10	42,22	34,88	25,00	17,89	20,75
Mean 36,10							

Source: own elaboration based on administrative records

This phenomenon can be understood as a product of the fragmentation between the management of the Minimum Revenue system (RIS-Guaranteed Income) and the management of the activation measures. Graph 1 shows the monthly average of resources per person over 18 months, 12 prior to the intervention and 6 for intervention. In the period prior to the intervention (baseline), the average access to resources is below 0.5%. The intervention takes the average to two points at the intermediate time of the same (at approximately three months).

Graph 1. Average monthly access to employment guidance and training services for the eight Waves (502 people)



Source: own elaboration based on administrative records

As indicated, to obtain the net result (impacts) of the intervention we consider it pertinent to analyze what happens in the six months after the intervention. Starting from a relatively low average, it is about investigating the

behavior of the participants in the semester after the end of their participation in the pilot.

Regarding the impact that the program has on the activation of the participants, a positive effect can be observed for all Waves analyzed, as shown in the following graphs, which express the average of services received by people in the previous semester (baseline), during the intervention and six months after the intervention.

These are undoubtedly the most relevant variables to assess the effect of the program in the short or medium term. If the difficulties of access to employment of the minimum income recipients and the discouragement effect are taken into account for the active search for employment that produce long periods of unemployment and precarious employment, the continuity in the use of activation resources It is a result of relevance in the itinerary of incorporation into employment.

Table 2. Percentage of resources by type (1-8) and by wave

WAVE/ SERVICE	Nº PARTICIP.	SERV. 1 (%)	SERV. 2(%)	SERV. 3(%)	SERV. 4(%)	SERV. 5(%)	SERV. 6(%)	SERV. 7(%)	SERV. 8(%)	TOTAL (%)
O1	45	1,80	10,54	0,00	21,85	25,45	11,31	27,25	0,26	100
O2	51	0,93	8,74	4,09	25,46	26,02	11,52	23,05	0,19	100
O3	41	0,56	10,56	5,56	24,72	23,33	10,28	25,00	0,00	100
O4	45	1,35	11,35	0,27	24,32	31,08	8,65	22,97	0,00	100
O5	43	0,79	10,73	0,79	26,96	27,23	11,52	21,99	0,00	100
O6	72	0,95	11,71	5,70	26,58	26,42	10,28	18,04	0,32	100
O7	95	0,14	13,75	4,31	25,14	25,00	11,25	20,42	0,00	100
O8	106	0,17	15,77	2,68	27,01	23,66	14,09	16,44	0,17	100

Source: own elaboration based on administrative records

Most of the actions focus on “Work on individual aspects for the BAE” and on “Information actions”. It should be taken into account that training / return services to the education system, although they are marginal from a percentage point of view, is a resource that usually involves a significant number of hours. As there is no specific information on the number of hours that each action or service entails, it is not possible to weigh them. But it must be emphasized for the interpretation of the results that its marginal proportion is not negligible. As will be indicated in the recommendations section, an improvement in the data of the administrative records will be

necessary to be able to evaluate future actions with greater precision.


Table 3 and Graph 2 summarize the impact of the first four Waves on the variable number of activation resources, which includes the counseling and training actions for employment included in the administrative records.

Table 3. Impact on access to resources. Semi-annual average of guidance and training resources for Waves 1 to 4.

4 WAVES		ANTES	DURANTE	DESPUÉS
	Intervención	1,01	9,08	4,99
	Control	0,94	1,79	1,83
			RN	3,09

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

Graph 2. Media semestral de recursos de orientación y formación para Waves 1 a 4.



Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

A positive impact is observed for the Waves as a whole of 3.09 on average. As a first point, it can be noted that the pilot has an incentive effect on the activation for employment. Participants do not show a “return to starting point” behavior but continue in the actions offered by employment services. This must be linked to what is stated above regarding the satisfaction of the users with the services received. Better services are a condition of reduced distance to employment by unemployed people.

To analyze this result - one of the most important in order to respond to the hypothesis of the project - it should be remembered that in the diagnosis itself prior to the launch of the project, insufficient intensity was indicated in the activation measures (training, orientation), especially for the most vulnerable groups, and an insufficient training offer and not adapted to the real needs of these groups. In that sense, it can be affirmed as a contribution to the evidence that the service integration model implemented in the framework of the project manages to reverse the problem of access to activation measures for those profiles farther from the labor market. In other words, as a contribution to the evidence, it can be affirmed that the impact on the orientation - training actions helps to support the ERSISI hypothesis as long as the permanence in the system after the intervention would indicate that the pathways towards employment are being encouraged and not discouraged.

To what extent the intervention improves the access to employment of the participants. Estimated by Difference-in-differences.

Table 3. Estimation of the variable effect number of contracts by DiD.


MEDIAS	AI1 18-12	AI2 12-6	PRI 6-0	I	PI 0-6	
INTERVENCIÓN	0,271	0,245	0,309	0,266	0,330	PD (PRI)= -0,122
CONTROL	0,165	0,223	0,431	0,527	0,330	SD= (PI)= 0 DN= 0,122

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

When analyzing the global results, merging the four Waves of the variable number of contracts, it is observed that the baseline shows a difference of -0,122 (first difference) in the semiannual average of contracts between the intervention and control group. The second difference tends to zero, so the

net result represents an improvement of 0.122 in the average total contracts signed by the people participating in the project.

Graph 3. DiD for average variable of total contracts



Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

If the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is analyzed, it can be seen that the high p-value indicates that the results are not statistically significant. As noted throughout the report, it will be necessary to wait for the totality of cases and then analyze the significance of the model.

Modelo 2: MCO, usando las observaciones 1-752

Variable dependiente: NC

	COEFICIENTE	DESV. TÍPICA	ESTADÍSTICO T	VALOR P
const	0.430851	0.0967130	4.455	<0.0001
P	-0.101064	0.136773	-0.7389	0.4602
D	-0.122340	0.136773	-0.8945	0.3714
D:P	0.122340	0.193426	0.6325	0.5273

MEDIA DE LA VBLE. DEP.	0.349734	D.T. de la vble. dep.	1.324269
SUMA DE CUAD. RESIDUOS	1315.314	D.T. de la regresión	1.326062
R-CUADRADO	0.001295	R-cuadrado corregido	-0.002710
F(3, 748)	0.323415	Valor p (de F)	0.808447
LOG-VEROSIMILITUD	-1277.261	Criterio de Akaike	2562.522
CRITERIO DE SCHWARZ	2581.013	Crit. de Hannan-Quinn	2569.646


However, instead of approaching it from the point of view of the average of contracts, the percentage of people who obtain at least one contract after the intervention is observed shows a remarkable improvement. It goes from a difference of 2.7% higher in the control group to a difference of 5.3% higher in the intervention group. According to the Difference-in-differences estimate, the net result would be an 8% improvement in the number of people who find a contract at the end of the intervention with respect to the control group.

Table 4. Impact on the contract variable expressed in the average number of contracts per person and in proportion of people with a contract

	ANTES (CONTRATOS/ PERS)	DESPUÉS (CONTRATOS/ PERS)	ANTES (PERS CONTRATA- DAS / TOTAL PERS)	DESPUÉS (PERS CON- TRATADAS / TOTAL PERS)
INTERVENCIÓN	58/188 (Media= 0,31)	62/188 (Media = 0,32)	34/188 (18%)	41/188 (21,8%)
CONTROL	80/188 (Media= 0,42)	69/188 (Media = 0,36)	39/188 (20,7%)	31/188 (16,5%)

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

Graph 4. Impact on the contracts variable expressed in proportion of people with contracts



Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

At this point, the results linked to employment incentives should be mentioned. As Table 27 shows, 12.8% of the total number of people in intervention obtained employment incentives in the semester prior to the intervention (baseline - AI12), and 13.3% the control group. It should be noticed that this 0.5% difference in absolute terms corresponds to a single individual. In the semester after the intervention, both groups show a percentage of 11.7%, which represents a total of 22 people. The net difference of 0.5% improvement for the intervention group, which does not represent a significant difference (only one person).

Table 5. Employment incentives for Waves 1 to 4. Absolute and relative

	AI12	AI6	I	DI6	
INTERV. (ABS.)	24	15	16	22	PD = 0,5% SD = 0 RN = -0,5%
CONTROL (ABS.)	25	14	30	22	
INTERV. %	12,8	8,0	8,5	11,7	
CONTROL %	13,3	7,4	16,0	11,7	

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

To what extent the intervention improves the decline in unemployment in the participants?


Table 6 shows the estimation by the DiD technique of the impact of the project on the unemployed months of the users, expressed as a semiannual average. The first difference is approximately 0.2 months on average and the second is 0.75, which shows a difference of 0.55 months on average in the semester in favor of the control group. That is, although in both groups the tendency is downward, which is a positive result, the decline is somewhat greater in the control group than in the intervention group (about two weeks in the semester).

Table 6. Semi-annual average of months in unemployment (high plaintiffs). DiD estimation

MEDIAS	AI1 18-12 m a.i.	AI2 12-6 m a.i.	PRI 6-0 m a.i.	I	PI 0-6m d.i	
INTERVENCION	4,750	4,957	5,122	4,963	4,495	PD (PRI)= 0,197 SD (PI)= 0,75 DN= 0,553
CONTROL	4,856	5,261	4,925	4,266	3,745	

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

Graph 4. Half-yearly average of unemployed months. Impact estimation by DiD.



Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

When analyzing the model of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), we see that the result is statistically significant at 10%, which gives validity to the result. However, the fact that the measurement has been carried out six months after the participation in the pilot is finished and that there are still four Waves left to be incorporated into the analysis mean that these results must be taken with caution. In fact, if the results linked to contracts, which marked a trend, although slight, positive, were analyzed, it could be assumed that the highest registration of unemployed people is due to contracts of a fixed duration and less than one month, which would mean entry and exit of the plaintiff register in the same month. The limitation of the administrative records regarding the duration of the contracts - it is possible to know the start date, but not the end date - makes this point lack more elements of analysis to make a more adjusted interpretation.

Modelo 1: MCO, usando las observaciones 1-752

Variable dependiente: PARO

	COEFICIENTE	DESV. TÍPICA	ESTADÍSTICO T	VALOR P	
CONST	4.92553	0.154986	31.78	<0.0001	***
P	-1.18085	0.219183	-5.388	<0.0001	***
D	0.196809	0.219183	0.8979	0.3695	
D:P	0.553191	0.309972	1.785	0.0747	*

MEDIA DE LA VBLE. DEP.	4.571809	D.T. de la vble. dep.	2.185816
SUMA DE CUAD. RESIDUOS	3377.883	D.T. de la regresión	2.125061
R-CUADRADO	0.058593	R-cuadrado corregido	0.054817
F(3, 748)	15.51850	Valor p (de F)	8.41e-10
LOG-VEROSIMILITUD	-1631.895	Criterio de Akaike	3271.789
CRITERIO DE SCHWARZ	3290.280	Crit. de Hannan-Quinn	3278.913

To what extent does the intervention allow participants to exit the Guaranteed Income system for employment placement?

As reflected in Table 7 and Graph 5, the semi-annual average of the perception of Guaranteed Income shows a downward trend for both groups, but somewhat higher in the control group (0.186). When analyzing the OLS model, it can be seen that this difference is not significant.


Table 7. Media semestral de prestación de RG. Estimación por DiD

MEDIAS	A11 18-12 m a.i.	A12 12-6 m a.i.	PRI 6-0 m a.i.	I	PI 0-6m d.i	
INTERVENCIÓN	3,574	4,361	5,085	4,537	4,079	PD (PRI)= 0,989 SD (PI)= 1,175 DN= 0,186
CONTROL	4,11	4,420	4,096	3,367	2,904	

Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

The graph shows a practically parallel decrease in the trends of both groups, which shows the zero trend of the net effect.

Graph 6. Media semestral de meses de prestación de RG. Estimación por DiD



Source: Own elaboration based on administrative records

Modelo 1: MCO, usando las observaciones 1-752

Variable dependiente: RG

	COEFICIENTE	DESV. TÍPICA	ESTADÍSTICO T	VALOR P	
CONST	4.09574	0.182643	22.42	<0.0001	***
P	-1.19149	0.258296	-4.613	<0.0001	***
D	0.989362	0.258296	3.830	0.0001	***
D:P	0.186170	0.365286	0.5097	0.6104	

MEDIA DE LA VBLE. DEP.	4.041223	D.T. de la vble. dep.	2.616073
SUMA DE CUAD. RESIDUOS	4690.995	D.T. de la regresión	2.504273
R-CUADRADO	0.087306	R-cuadrado corregido	0.083645
F(3, 748)	23.85053	Valor p (de F)	9.49e-15
LOG-VEROSIMILITUD	-1755.371	Criterio de Akaike	3518.743
CRITERIO DE SCHWARZ	3537.234	Crit. de Hannan-Quinn	3525.867

If we take into account what is indicated in the section corresponding to the logic of the intervention, this specific variable is the one that requires the greatest time distance with the end of the participation in the pilot. If, first of all, an improvement in the participation of people in activation actions for employment is to be expected, which can lead twelve months later to an improvement in the results linked to employment (hiring and months in unemployment), it is necessary to wait for the eventual improvement in employment to have an effect on people's need for monetary resources that guarantee minimum living standards. Moreover, taking into account the type of contracts usually obtained in the population furthest away from the labour market, a considerable increase in employment incentives is to be

expected before the exit from the minimum income system, which we have seen has not occurred significantly.

In short, as a contribution to the evidence, it cannot be stated until now that the project has had an effect on the variables referring to employment and exit from the minimum income system. It has been pointed out that it is still too early to carry out methodologically adequate measurements, since not enough post-intervention time has passed. More robust results will be available in June 2020.



CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION



CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The preliminary results of the integrated and integral intervention corresponding to 188 of the 502 people participating in the project show a positive impact on the variables related to participation in ECPs, with an improvement of 3.09 in the average of semiannual resources at the end the intervention. In addition, there is an improvement in the percentage of people who find at least one contract the semester following the intervention. The net result is 8%. These two indicators mark an encouraging trend as evidences of the integrated and integral care model, especially if one takes into account the little time that has passed since the end of the pilot.

These are so far the most outstanding results of the project. Therefore, the importance of incorporation and permanence in the activation system of a population group that, as has been shown, makes very low intensity use of these resources must be emphasized. Both in the project's own assumptions and in the European recommendations and in the specialized literature (Laparra Navarro et al., 2007; Pérez Eransus, 2010, 2016; Zalakain, 2017), it is indicated that it is the fundamental responsibility of the public administrations to offer the adequate services that facilitate the pathways of inclusion to people at risk or in a situation of social exclusion. In this sense, one of the main evidences thrown by the ERSISI project points out that the integration of services and the person-centered approach are effective ways to achieve a change in behavior towards activation for employment - seen from the point of view of change in individuals - and to ensure compliance with access to services - seen from the point of view of effective compliance with rights.

Regarding the variables linked to the average of contracts, the stimuli to employment, the months of unemployment and the months of permanence in GR, the results do not show significant effects. That is, so far, the project would not show significant effects on these variables.

How to explain the preliminary results referring to employment variables and minimum income? First, as noted, the specialized literature recommends evaluating these last three variables from 12 months after the end of the intervention. In the case of Guaranteed Income, being a variable that depends on the link to quality employment - good contracts and salaries to not need financial support - the ideal time for its measurement would be from months 18 - 24 of the end of the inclusion itinerary. That is, the six-month impacts, as measured in this report, can give some insight into the trends in the results, but in no case should they be interpreted as definitive.

Secondly, it must be emphasized that there is a central set of factors when analyzing the link between recipients of non-contributory benefits and employment. On the one hand, as mentioned at the beginning, the context of growth in hiring does not reach the pre-crisis levels, so it does not benefit the sectors farthest from the labor market. On the other hand, it should be noted the structural condition that has acquired in recent decades, and particularly in the context of the crisis, “working poor” (ESPN, 2019; Martínez Virto, 2019), that is, people who Even having a job, they cannot overcome the poverty thresholds.

This is linked, in turn, with the phenomenon called “the poverty trap”. In the design of the Minimum Income Systems, this trap is incurred when there is conditionality in a benefit that is subject to not receiving other sources of income. The “poverty trap” is added to the poverty trap, that is, the one that discourages accepting job offers because, due to the precarious condition of the contracts, although in principle they may represent a temporary increase in income from above the minimum income, when the employment period ends, it takes so long to recover the previous help that in the final calculation it is not beneficial for people (Zalakain, 2014).

Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the institutional mechanisms that aim to “make work pay” to offer economic protection both to people without income who find jobs and to those who have insufficient labor income. The existing evidence in other European countries shows that the development of these policies, when properly designed, can have a positive impact in terms of stimulating job placement and, above all, in terms of protection of people with low salaries, thus returning to employment their protective capacity against poverty and as a tool for social integration (ESPN, 2019; Zalakain, 2006).

In the case of Navarra, the double right to social inclusion and guaranteed income has established the mechanism of “employment incentives” by which part of the income from labor activities is excluded from the calculation of available resources. As noted above (p. 26 et seq.), Although from the normative point the employment incentives are already in force, the implementation of this mechanism has not yet been completed due to the ignorance of the users and, in part, the lack of familiarity on the part of the technical personnel. All this undoubtedly affects the incentives for users to access jobs. Therefore, one of the main recommendations indicates that it is necessary to continue with the improvement in the functioning of employment incentives, with the aim of improving the institutional framework that affects the “decision” - the incentive or disincentive - of the recipients of Guaranteed income when accepting new jobs.

A third factor that would explain the behavior of the variables related to employment and Guaranteed Income has to do with those points that in the implementation have been indicated as less effective. In the same way that the management of stimuli to employment should be improved, there is an important margin for improvement in relation to active employment policies. The work of the local Employment Groups has revealed the possible direction of the SAPs designed from the local level, but work must continue to be made in the flexibility of training resources, in the expansion of employment promotion mechanisms and mainly in the intermediation tasks between job seekers and employer sectors. The job creation sectors must have a much more important role in influencing actions that lead to an effective fulfillment of the right to socio-labor inclusion.

As a final reflection, it should be noted that with the evidence contained in the report, the initial hypothesis is a plausible approach to continue working on strengthening the right to social inclusion. The integrated work between Social Services and Employment Services has shown a favorable response in the target population, particularly in its incentive to adopt, together with the professionals of the services, avenues of active inclusion that can favor their autonomy and improvement in the medium term in the living conditions.

For these results to be embodied and consolidated institutionally, public commitment will be essential for the continuity and expansion of the integrated and integral care model. ERSISI has meant the first step of a complex path but that has shown to lead to results that can favor the improvement in the living conditions of the citizenship.

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